

03-74

STATSPEC

Approved For Release 1994/09/25 : CIA-RDP85T00815R000300070003-5

TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

CONFIDENTIAL

16 JANUARY 1974

01 OF 01

DOC 1/5 EP
Confidential

F B I S

STATSPEC

TRENDS

In Communist Propaganda

Confidential

16 JANUARY 1974
(VOL. XXV, NO. 3)

This propaganda analysis report is based exclusively on material carried in foreign broadcast and press media. It is published by FBIS without coordination with other U.S. Government components.



STATSPEC

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized disclosure subject to
criminal sanctions

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

16 JANUARY 1974

CONTENTS

ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT

USSR Notes Kissinger's Egypt, Israel Talks on Disengagement . . 1

ENERGY CRISIS

USSR Downplays U.S. Conference Call, Depicts Western Disarray . 3

INDOCHINA

Mild Response to Schlesinger Warning, U.S. Planes for GVN . . . 5

PRC-GVN

PRC Claims Contested Islands, Resources in South China Sea . . 6

USSR

Brezhnev Endorses Moldavian Kolkhoz Council Innovation 8

Debate Over Economic Planning Surfaces in the Central Press . . 8

CHINA

Teng Hsiang-ping Regains Membership on CCP Politburo 11

Peking Explains Limits of Campaign to Reform Education 12

NOTES

CSCE: Timing of Final Stage; South Korean Emergency Measures;
Moscow Roundtable "Spontaneity"; Brezhnev Trip to Cuba 14

APPENDIX

Moscow, Peking Broadcast Statistics 1

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

16 JANUARY 1974

- 1 -

ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT

USSR NOTES KISSINGER'S EGYPT, ISRAEL TALKS ON DISENGAGEMENT

Moscow is giving somewhat more news coverage to Secretary Kissinger's third visit to the Middle East than it had to his previous trips. Moscow has avoided any hints of displeasure at the secretary's prominent role, reporting his comings and goings in a factual manner. It has, however, drawn attention to its own stake in the negotiations by revealing, in a TASS report on the 16th, that Gromyko had held a "friendly" talk with the Egyptian ambassador, presumably to receive the latter's briefing on the course of the talks. Cairo radio had announced on the 15th that Egyptian Foreign Minister Fahmi had sent a letter to Gromyko informing him about developments. Gromyko was reported by TASS as having reaffirmed the USSR's "consistent line" in support of the just cause of Egypt and the other Arab states.

Soviet media have chronicled Kissinger's movements back and forth between Egypt and Israel in short, straightforward reports, noting that the main topic of discussion was the issue of disengagement. Arabic-language broadcasts on the 12th reported Kissinger as having expressed hope to the Egyptians that he would be able to find a decision acceptable to both sides and that an agreement could be reached on the principles of troop separation. Cairo's AL-AHRAM was cited as saying Kissinger had shown understanding of the Egyptian attitude on this issue. Subsequent Moscow Arabic-language broadcasts noted news agency reports that Israel had agreed to proposals to solve the problem; they also cited Egyptian Foreign Minister Fahmi's statement that the Israeli plan brought by Kissinger was "unsatisfactory" and that an Egyptian plan had been presented to Kissinger.

The only skeptical observation on the progress in discussions thus far came in a domestic service newscast on the 14th, which reported Kissinger's return to Aswan and remarked that "through Tel Aviv's fault," the problems of troop disengagement "are proving to be very complicated."

Criticizing details of Israel's proposals publicized earlier, a panelist on the weekly observers roundtable broadcast by Moscow radio on the 13th pointed to Israel's demand for reduction of Egyptian forces and armaments in the canal zone and called Israel's ideas "clearly unrealistic." Earlier, TASS, in reporting

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

16 JANUARY 1974

- 2 -

Kissinger's arrival in Cairo on the 11th, had pointed out that troop disengagement was one of the points in the "agreement reached during Kissinger's Mideast visit" last November, but that Israeli "procrastination" in the Kilometer 101 meetings and in the meetings of the military working group at the Geneva conference had prevented the agreement from being implemented.

EGYPTIAN POSITION

A Moscow Arabic-language broadcast on the 13th, summing up Foreign Minister Fahmi's foreign policy statement reported by Cairo radio that day, said the proposed Egyptian plan stipulates full Israeli withdrawal from Arab territories, the return of the Arab part of Jerusalem, and a solution of the Palestinian problem. Fahmi particularly stressed, the broadcast observed, that Egypt would not agree to the conclusion of a "separate" peace agreement with Israel, since the Middle East problem concerned all Arab countries.

Soviet media have repeatedly cited the Cairo press' insistence that disengagement must be linked to a general settlement and implementation of Security Council resolutions. The panelist on the 13 January observers roundtable declared Moscow's "full support" for Egypt's position that disengagement should be regarded as the first stage, and that this should be followed by the complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from all territories occupied since 5 June 1967. The panelist explained that the USSR believes that the earliest possible agreement on disengagement would make it possible to begin examination of the whole complex of problems in a Middle East settlement. The panelist did not raise the question of whether and how a disengagement agreement should be linked to commitments for subsequent withdrawals. Soviet media have reported, however, that AL-AHRAM has called for linking disengagement to "future steps to be mapped out beforehand" and has said that subsequent stages must be carried out in accordance with "predetermined dates." Previous Egyptian suggestions for a timetable for staged implementation of Security Council Resolution 242, advanced by Cairo in 1968, had been endorsed by Moscow at the time as a "realistic proposal."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

16 JANUARY 1974

- 3 -

ENERGY CRISIS

USSR DOWNPLAYS U.S. CONFERENCE CALL, DEPICTS WESTERN DISARRAY

Moscow has originated minimal low-level comment on President Nixon's 9 January call for a conference of major noncommunist oil-consuming countries. Soviet comment on other aspects of the energy crisis and reviews of foreign press articles present a picture of Western disarray. Moscow reporting has focused on what it describes as the self-serving and discriminatory U.S. practices directed against both West European and Arab countries and suggests that U.S. leadership is not acceptable to most other countries.

While avoiding any authoritative comment on President Nixon's conference initiative, Moscow radio and TASS have carried numerous reviews of articles in the Western press indicating that recent U.S. policy moves have met with a cautious response at best, and that some countries--France in particular--have been sharply critical of U.S. intentions. Moscow's only direct comment on the Nixon 9 January proposals, in a radio broadcast to Arab listeners on the 14th, asserted that the failure to invite the Arab countries to the proposed initial conference on 11 February constituted proof of "the biased nature" of the U.S. move and signified Western collusion against the Arabs. Moscow broadcasts in Arabic continue to defend the right of the Arab states to employ oil as a political weapon and nationalize foreign oil companies. Moscow has reported without comment the U.S. invitation to oil producer nations to meet later with consumer nation representatives, while citing negative Cairo press reaction to this second conference proposal.

On 13 January IZVESTIYA's international affairs department editor Grigoryants avoided discussing the latest U.S. initiative in a wide-ranging Moscow radio Roundtable covering other energy developments. However, he maintained that the earlier proposal in December for a multinational energy action group, promoted by President Nixon and Secretary of State Kissinger, envisaged a united front of capitalist states which the United States would attempt to use to break the oil embargo imposed by the Arab states. He also stated that the recent improvement in the dollar exchange rate was "inseparably linked with maneuvering by the American oil companies" aimed at increasing their profits. He added that "the panic" existing in Western monetary markets mirrored the impact of this maneuvering on the relations between

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

16 JANUARY 1974

- 4 -

the United States and Common Market countries. In the same vein, PRAVDA commentator Ovchinnikov charged on the 13th that the multinational corporations dominated by the United States were deliberately aggravating the situation by engaging in speculative activities. Another PRAVDA commentator, Yuriy Kharlanov, wrote on the same day that the oil crisis was a manifestation "of the overall illness of capitalism."

OTHER COMMUNIST
REACTION

Other communist media have carried little original comment on President Nixon's conference proposals, but the tenor of available reporting has been uniformly negative. Peking has not mentioned the subject. East European media have disseminated only a few commentaries, with Bulgaria, East Germany and Yugoslavia offering the most pointed criticism. Their common theme is the charge that the U.S. initiatives seek to increase U.S. influence and control over the Arab and the Western capitalist countries. In a particularly acid commentary broadcast by Belgrade radio on the 9th, Bojan Dimitrijevic contended that the U.S. energy action group proposal represented a "colonialist approach" to the solution of the oil shortage problem, and that its acceptance would "only provoke new crises, conflicts and disagreements."

U.S. MILITARY "THREAT"

Defense Secretary Schlesinger's remark in a TV interview on 7 January on the possibility of military reprisals against Arab countries was widely criticized as an example of U.S. high-handedness. Aleksandr Druzhinin, a political observer for Moscow radio and television, in a Moscow radio broadcast on the 13th accused Schlesinger of threatening to use force if the oil embargo was not ended and said plans existed for the seizure of oil fields in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. In a more conciliatory vein, TASS Deputy Director Sergey Losev said in an English broadcast to North America the next day that such threats were unnecessary, because as soon as Arab goals in Palestine were achieved the need to employ "the oil weapon" would disappear. Peking's NCNA transmitted a lengthy report on international criticism of the Schlesinger remarks. Belgrade's TANJUG on 11 January alleged that 3,000 U.S. Marines were deployed in France and Spain for possible intervention in the Middle East.

CONFIDENTIAL

- 5 -

INDOCHINA

MILD RESPONSE TO SCHLESINGER WARNING, U.S. PLANES FOR GVN

Consistent with the moderate tone of current Vietnamese communist propaganda, Hanoi and the Front issued no official statements on Defense Secretary Schlesinger's reiteration, at his 10 January press conference, that the United States might respond to a large-scale offensive by North Vietnam.* Liberation Radio on the 11th merely pointed out that this "insolent, slanderous, and threatening allegation" had now become a "familiar trick of the U.S. authorities" but that it can no longer "intimidate" anyone. Chiming in on the 12th, a Hanoi broadcast claimed that these "repeated threats" and the Defense Department's announcement--on 8 January--that the United States would be replacing Saigon's F-5A with the more modern F-5E constituted a "gross violation" of the "spirit and letter" of the peace agreement. Other reaction to the F-5E announcement included a 10 January NHAN DAN commentary which called the U.S. move a "brazen distortion" of Article 7 of the Paris Agreement.

Reflecting similar moderation, Hanoi and the PRG issued restrained foreign ministry spokesman's statements in response to the recent alleged increase in Saigon air attacks on PRG-held territory--and especially the reported bombing of an TCCS compound at Duc Co in Pleiku Province. The PRG Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement, released on the 12th, charged that since 29 December Saigon had "stepped up its air raids on many populated areas deep in the PRG-controlled zone," and labeled "particularly serious" the alleged 11 January air attack on Duc Co. The PRG protest concluded by warning routinely that the "U.S. Government" and Saigon must be held responsible for the consequences of "their military adventures." The DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's protest was even milder than the PRG's and omitted the usual reference to the United States.

* The DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman had issued statements on 8 January 1974 and on 26 June, 17 August, and 1 December 1973 protesting speculation by Secretary Schlesinger about the possibility of resumed U.S. bombing in the event of an offensive. The PRG Foreign Ministry spokesman issued similar protests on each occasion, except in August 1973. See TRENDS of 9 January 1974, page 9, for background.

CONFIDENTIAL

- 6 -

P R C - G V N

P R C CLAIMS CONTESTED ISLANDS, RESOURCES IN SOUTH CHINA SEA

An 11 January PRC Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement has for the first time specifically laid broad claims to natural resources in the sea adjoining four contested South China Sea island groups. Pegged to Saigon's official incorporation--last September--of several islands of the Nansha (Spratly) chain into a GVN province, the statement reiterated Peking's position that China owns the Spratly as well as the neighboring Hsisha (Paracel), Chungsha, and Tungsha islands.* It charged Saigon with intensified encroachment on the Spratly and Paracel islands, observing that such actions arouse Chinese "indignation." (A 16 January GVN Foreign Ministry statement, responding to Peking's protest, charged that the Chinese have recently sent men to some of the disputed islands, where they set up tents and Chinese flags. It warned that Saigon would not tolerate such actions, which it said constitute a "threat to the peace and security of the region.")

Peking long ago claimed territorial sovereignty over the four island groups, in a 15 August 1951 statement by Chou En-lai specifying Chinese reservations to a U.S.-sponsored draft of an allied peace treaty with Japan. Peking has since reiterated its territorial claim in response to various actions in the area by governments--Saigon, Manila, and Taipei--which also claim all or part of the four island groups. The last known Chinese protest was contained in a 16 July 1971 speech by PLA Chief of Staff Huang Yung-sheng and an accompanying NCNA article which denounced Philippine President Marcos' 10 July 1971 announcement that Manila intended to use armed troops to assert its claim to certain of the Spratly Islands.

Unlike previous statements of Peking's position, however, the current spokesman's pronouncement included a specific claim to

* The Chinese statement said certain of the Nansha islands, "including Nanwei and Taiping" had "not long ago" been put under the administration of Saigon's Phuoc Tuy Province. A 12 January Saigon press report of a GVN spokesman's remarks that day, in response to the PRC protest, said that Saigon in September 1973 had incorporated islands (called Chungsha by Saigon) into Phuoc Tuy Province.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

16 JANUARY 1974

- 7 -

the "natural resources in the sea areas" around the four island groups. The addition of this claim conforms with and effectively completes Peking's efforts in recent years to stake out firm positions on the sea resources along the East Asian continental shelf, prior to a ruling on this crucial issue at the international Law of the Sea conference scheduled to convene this June. The Chinese had already laid claim to sea and seabed resources along the China coastline, most recently in a 15 March 1973 foreign ministry spokesman's statement protesting a U.S. company's oil exploration in the Yellow and East China seas. Peking had also asserted full rights to resources adjoining Taiwan and the contested Senkaku Islands in a series of authoritative pronouncements in 1971 and 1972.

CONFIDENTIAL

- 8 -

U S S R

BREZHNEV ENDORSES MOLDAVIAN KOLKHOZ COUNCIL INNOVATION

In a 9 January speech at an awards ceremony in Kishinev, Politburo member Pelshe for the first time revealed that Brezhnev had endorsed the controversial Moldavian kolkhoz council experiment in his unpublished speech at the December CPSU Central Committee plenum. In making this disclosure, which was reported in PRAVDA as well as locally, Pelshe expressed his own approval of the experiment, becoming the third Politburo member to do so.*

Pelshe's comments appeared in a speech presenting an Order of Friendship of Peoples to the Moldavian republic. After praising the Moldavian leadership for having shifted control over farms from the agriculture ministry to kolkhoz councils, Pelshe declared that "it is a pleasure to report to you that at the recent CPSU Central Committee plenum Comrade L.I. Brezhnev gave a high evaluation to the Moldavian experiment." Brezhnev's endorsement is not surprising, as he had tentatively endorsed a similar proposal for kolkhoz unions in 1966. Pelshe and several other Politburo members had also supported the earlier proposal.

DEBATE OVER ECONOMIC PLANNING SURFACES IN THE CENTRAL PRESS

The debate over reforms in Soviet economic planning and management, which in recent years has been relatively muted though clearly dominated by defenders of the status quo, appears to be entering a new stage of more heated polemics. A highly provocative article that sharply criticized the traditional system of planning and openly advocated a number of far-reaching reforms appeared in the December issue of QUESTIONS OF ECONOMICS, on the eve of the 10-11 December CPSU Central Committee plenum. Although the plenum deliberations have been kept secret in accordance with the practice of recent years, the followup comment indicates that the plenum focused on problems of economic management and considered Brezhnev's cryptic call for "a system of measures aimed at raising the effectiveness of management and

* For an analysis of Polyanskiy's endorsement of the innovation, see the TRENDS of 5 July 1973, pages 16-17.

CONFIDENTIAL

16 JANUARY 1974

- 9 -

planning and improving the entire economic mechanism." Despite the apparent renewal of official interest in economic reform, conservative spokesmen have continued to uphold the virtues of the traditional planning system.

DECEMBER ARTICLE The QUESTIONS OF ECONOMICS article by a prominent Soviet specialist on manpower, Ye. L. Manevich, dealt with the problem of improving the use of labor and other resources in the economy. Because of its highly provocative content, it was designated a "discussion" article by the editors of the journal.

Pointing to various glaring economic inefficiencies, Manevich proposed a number of reforms designed to stimulate the economy by reducing the proliferation of central controls, expanding the rights of enterprises and production associations, and increasing the incentives for management and labor. His principal proposals were:

- + Establishment of a single income tax on the profits of enterprises in place of the variety of payments now levied on enterprises by the state and granting enterprises complete control over profits after taxes;
- + Reduction of the number of centrally funded producer goods in the supply system and expansion of commercial trade between enterprises;
- + Improvement of the "entire system" of wages and bonuses, which has not undergone any basic reforms in over 15 years, in order to stimulate increased productivity and greater use of production reserves.

In advancing these proposals, Manevich argued that the current system of planning and management was seriously impeding economic progress. He charged that present plans were merely compiled on the basis of the previous year's results, thus encouraging enterprises to hide reserves. He pointed out, for example, that the current system of levies on profits of enterprises was too complex and burdensome, consequently inhibiting managerial initiative. He likewise insisted that the highly regulated system of wholesale trade, with its centrally planned allocations and guaranteed markets, did not

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBI'S TRENDS

16 JANUARY 1974

- 10 -

encourage enterprises to improve the quality of their products. And he also charged that the system of incentives was seriously hampered by the trend toward reducing wage differentials for workers of varying skills and the practice of placing numerous restrictions on the size and use of bonuses.

OTHER PROPOSALS Manevich's proposals are similar to other currently debated schemes to give enterprises greater incentive to adopt "strenuous" plans instead of hoarding reserves. In the 23 May LITERARY GAZETTE philosopher V. Yakushev argued that incentives are presently linked too closely with plans and quotas, leading enterprises to seek plans that can be easily met. His solution was to detach the incentives from the indices for plan fulfillment and base them on the levels of production in comparable enterprises.

Yakushev's proposals and similar proposals by other economists to renounce the traditional stress on plan fulfillment and transform legally binding plans into "recommendations" were denounced in the December issue of the Gosplan organ PLANNED ECONOMY by G. Kosyachenko, director of the finance ministry's research institute and onetime head of Gosplan. He attacked the proponents of such reforms for belittling the importance of centralized planning. Those advocating greater independence for enterprises and treating central planning as an impediment to progress were also attacked in a September ZHURNALIST interview by K.N. Rudnev, Minister of Instrument Making, Automation Equipment and Control Systems.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

16 JANUARY 1974

- 11 -

CHINA

TENG HSIAO-PING REGAINS MEMBERSHIP ON CCP POLITBURO

A further step in the rehabilitation of Teng Hsiao-ping, former CCP Secretary General who was purged with Liu Shao-chi in 1966, was evident on 11 January when he was included in a list of CCP Politburo members in NCNA's account of the funeral for Wang Shu-sheng, vice minister of national defense. Teng surfaced as a Vice Premier in April 1973 and was named to the CCP Central Committee at the 10th Party Congress in August.*

The circumstances of his return to the Politburo are not known, but it is possible that the decision was taken at the time of the reshuffle of PLA military region commanders, announced earlier this month. No plenary session of the Central Committee has been announced; the party constitution adopted at the 10th CCP Congress says that Politburo members are elected only by Central Committee plenums, although in recent years such constitutional requirements have been ignored. It is possible that Teng may also have become a member of the Politburo Standing Committee. The 11 January NCNA item followed the list of Standing Committee members with the names of other Politburo members in stroke order. Thus, immediately after Standing Committee member Chang Chun-chiao, NCNA listed Teng and then Wei Kuo-ching, although with four strokes in both names either could have headed the list of ordinary Politburo members.

The reemergence of Teng, together with the reshuffle of military region commanders, seems to show the dominance of Chou En-lai and the party-centered coalition he heads. While Chou and Teng were on opposite sides during the cultural revolution, Teng's administrative talents and experience should take some of the burden from Chou. Teng's resurgence also signifies that although cultural revolution "new things" must be preserved, not all cultural revolution changes are permanent. The promotion should encourage other former party officials and reassure them that they were not the target of the anti-Confucius campaign's warning against "calling back to office those who have retired." Teng's new status may also be a signal that the long-awaited National People's Congress is not far distant and that a decision has been made to give Teng a high state post.

* During the Cultural Revolution, Teng was under heavy fire in the Red Guard press and was cited in a few provincial references to the "Liu-Teng line."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

16 JANUARY 1974

- 12 -

PEKING EXPLAINS LIMITS OF CAMPAIGN TO REFORM EDUCATION

Amid continuing injunctions to correct the sensitive "red" and expert balance in the educational system, PRC propagandists have explained what is not meant by the call to "go against the tide" in educational reform--a slogan introduced last July and endorsed at the party congress in August. Commentators say the call must not be interpreted as a green light for disruption of school discipline or classroom order. Teachers and students are to work under party tutelage in the same "revolutionary trench" to implement Mao's educational line. Massive purges of educational authorities--a damaging aspect of the Red Guards' attack on the educational system during the cultural revolution--do not appear in the offing, as officials guilty of educational shortcomings have been encouraged to remain in their posts and participate in the reform.

The most comprehensive call for party members to steer educational activists away from any return to the chaotic school situation of the cultural revolution years was set forth in an NCNA article on 11 January. It argued that the current drive to safeguard the political restraints imposed on the education system during the cultural revolution is aimed only at achieving "a better education system...and a better revolutionary discipline and order." To illustrate this point, the article described how a local student had misread recent calls for educational reform and wrongly concluded that "I will raise hell, starting today." Other students quickly denounced this view, explaining that the struggle against the "revisionist" education line "will not bring chaos into the schools." Asserting that prompt republication by central newspapers of student complaints against the educational system was evidence of the leadership's attention to necessary educational reforms, the article specifically praised the Peking party committee for successfully rectifying the style of work in Peking's middle and primary schools.

Judging by the methods approved for carrying out educational changes, Peking is seeking to prevent the campaign from degenerating and slipping from party control. A Hangchow broadcast on 11 January, for example, lauded a local party committee for helping activists use "facts and reasoning to persuade" those guilty of mistakes in educational work to "stand firm, and take an active part in the revolution in education." Similarly, a Kweiyang radio article on 8 January concluded that even in areas where there are many problems the majority of cadres are good, and that discussion and persuasion

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
16 JANUARY 1974

- 13 -

should be used instead of suppression to overcome shortcomings. Calls for educational reform continue to stress the need to follow the party's lead. A Foochow broadcast on 8 January revealed that the first secretaries of several local party committees are "personally" in charge of the drive.

A Central issue in the debate now raging on educational reform is the longstanding problem of carving out a permanent place for worker-propaganda teams in the schools. New indications of tension between the teams and educational authorities--an endemic theme in PRC media since 1968, when the teams responded to Mao's call to enter the schools and conduct educational reform--surfaced in a Sian broadcast on 10 January that specifically asked party committees to intensify their efforts to overcome opposition to worker teams in the schools. Disruption of classroom activities does not appear to be a task of the teams, as the broadcast also praised local workers for making teachers more aware of their responsibility to raise the cultural level of backward students.

Another major reform championed by critics of the educational system is the need to strike a better equilibrium between political and professional training in the schools. Taiyuan radio on 11 January expressed concern over the heavy emphasis in recent years on professional studies, a means used to salvage a new educational system from the ruins of the cultural revolution. Reflecting the short shrift given to a policy dear to Mao's heart, the article noted that during one period of 20 months at Shansi University only one month was spent going down to villages and factories.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBI'S TRENDS

16 JANUARY 1974

- 14 -

NOTES

CSCE: TIMING OF FINAL STAGE: As the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) reconvened on 15 January after the holiday recess, Moscow commentators remained vague about how long the present second stage might last or when the third and final stage would be called. Moscow has now become more cautious about committing itself publicly to any precise timetable, in contrast to last fall, when before the second stage of the CSCE talks began in Geneva both Moscow and its East European allies were virtually adamant in demanding that the second stage be concluded and the third convened before the end of 1973. While this may reflect declining expectations regarding the CSCE outcome, it also has the effect of increasing Moscow's negotiating flexibility.

The present phraseology calls for conclusion of the present stage and convening the third and final stage by "spring or summer." This was the phrase used by PRAVDA's Orestov on 23 December and by the same paper's Kolesnichenko on 6 January. IZVESTIYA's Grigoryants used a similar time frame on the weekly Moscow radio international discussion program on 13 January, saying it was "possible" to hold the concluding stage in "late spring or early summer." East European spokesmen have been similarly cautious, with Hungary's newly appointed foreign minister Puja expressing hope on 10 January, after meetings with Gromyko and Brezhnev, that the third stage "might be held soon, perhaps in the summer." The head of the GDR delegation to the CSCE, Bock, has also been reported as saying that the third stage should be held in the first half of 1974.

SOUTH KOREAN EMERGENCY MEASURES: Although Pyongyang, Peking, and Moscow have criticized South Korea for promulgating stringent emergency measures on 8 January, Pyongyang and Moscow have not reacted at the same level as they did in December 1971, when a similar state of emergency was imposed. On 11 January Pyongyang released an "authorized" KCNA statement sharply denouncing the measures adopted by "the Pak Chong-hui puppet clique in its new move of fascist suppression against the South Korean people." Under similar circumstances in 1971, however, Pyongyang issued a foreign ministry statement. Moscow, which in 1971 had published a signed article in PRAVDA denouncing the state of emergency, has responded to the latest move with several

CONFIDENTIAL

16 JANUARY 1974

- 15 -

tendentious TASS reports and comparatively restrained radio commentaries broadcast in Korean. Peking condemned South Korea both times in PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator articles.

MOSCOW ROUNDTABLE "SPONTANEITY": An insight into the spontaneity--or lack of it--on Moscow radio's domestic service Sunday "international observers' roundtable" was provided by the 13 January weekly roundtable. In what appears to be a break with usual practice, one section of this program was an almost verbatim repeat of a commentary broadcast the previous day by Moscow's domestic service. The discourse among the panelists has generally appeared to be unscripted and spontaneous, but it has not been uncommon for sections of the roundtable to be rebroadcast at a later time or date and attributed to a roundtable panelist. In the 13 January roundtable, remarks by IZVESTIYA international affairs editor Boris Dmitriyev on the Middle East disengagement talks repeated, with a few emendations, a commentary attributed only to "our observer" broadcast on the 12th. An introductory paragraph in this commentary referring to Secretary Kissinger's talks in Egypt was omitted by Dmitriyev, and the commentary's concluding paragraph was read in the roundtable program by radio/TV commentator Druzhinin, as if he were commenting on Dmitriyev's discussion.

BREZHNEV TRIP TO CUBA: No date has been announced for Brezhnev's trip to Cuba although both Moscow and Havana had indicated last July, shortly after Brezhnev's U.S. visit, that he would go to Havana at the end of the year. A report of a TASS interview with Cuban central committee secretary Blas Roca, published in PRAVDA on 13 January, cited the Cuban party official's remarks that the "impending" visit by Brezhnev is of "great international significance" since it is taking place during a time of major global changes and in an "atmosphere of relaxation of tensions." In comment pegged to the visit, the media have stressed the importance of Soviet economic aid to Cuba, citing effusive Cuban praise for the "main role" such aid has played in the development of the Cuban economy. It has also hailed the visit, the first by Brezhnev to Cuba, as a "historic new landmark" in further strengthening Soviet-Cuban ties. Moscow has also drawn attention to the visit's significance in the context of international detente, thus suggesting that Moscow does not anticipate the visit will be an irritant to its relations with the United States.

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS
16 JANUARY 1974

- 1 -

APPENDIX

MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 7 - 13 JANUARY 1974

<u>Moscow (2637 items)</u>			<u>Peking (1047 items)</u>		
China	(5%)	8%	Domestic Issues	(55%)	57%
Attacks on Solzhenitsyn	(2%)	5%	Vietnam	(2%)	7%
CPSU Central Committee	(7%)	3%	[PRC Foreign Ministry	(--)	5%]
Appeal on 5-Year Plan			Statement on Saigon-		
WORLD MARXIST REVIEW	(--)	3%	claimed Islands		
Meeting in Prague,			Japanese Foreign Minister	(7%)	5%
7-9 Jan.			Ohira in PRC		
[Statement on Chile	(--)	2%]	Korea	(1%)	4%
			NCNA Attack on Soviet	(--)	3%
			"Fascist Rule"		

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.